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Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts1 substantially improves understanding of the federal judicial sys-
tem. Professor Martha Dragich first clearly describes the phenomena 
which she attributes to unprecedented increases in the number of appeals 
since the 1960s. The writer asserts that this "crisis of volume" has com-
promised "appellate justice" and made federal case law less "coherent." 
Because Professor Dragich finds that appeals courts' dual responsibili-
ties to correct error in specific cases and to declare the law have also 
decreased justice and coherence, she proposes the creation of District 
Court Appellate Panels for correcting error and a Unitary Court of 
Appeals for "making law." 
Once a Century significantly enhances comprehension of the judi-
cial process. Professor Dragich affords much instructive information 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Lauren Robel and Peggy 
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this 
piece, and Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I serve on 
the Ninth Circuit District Local Rules Review Committee and on the Advisory Group that the 
United States District Court for the District of Montana has appointed under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine. 
1. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11. 
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and numerous perceptive insights about which there is widespread 
agreement. For example, she offers helpful empirical data on the growth 
of appellate filings; few federal courts experts dispute that this increase 
has modified the appeals courts particularly by requiring judges to 
resolve mounting dockets with limited resources. Even Professor 
Dragich's comparatively provocative ideas require readers to reconsider 
traditional ways of conceptualizing the courts. For instance, her analysis 
of appellate lawmaking, her plea for maximum national uniformity in 
the interpretation of federal law, and her call for a Unitary Court of 
Appeals suggest that regional circuits could now be outmoded. 
Notwithstanding Professor Dragich's valuable contributions, some 
disagreement and even controversy attend her account. Most important, 
it remains unclear that justice is as diluted and that case law is as inco-
herent as she claims and, thus, that they are problematic enough to war-
rant treatment. This lack of clarity regarding justice, coherence, and 
many other attributes of modem appeals courts partly explains why there 
is less consensus about the need to apply numerous measures which 
might improve them. 
All of these ideas mean that Once a Century deserves a response. 
This essay undertakes that effort. I first briefly describe the article and 
then evaluate Professor Dragich's critique of the appeals courts, empha-
sizing her assignment of responsibility for reductions in justice and 
coherence to the crisis of volume. I next assess Professor Dragich's pre-
scriptions and ascertain that there is insufficient understanding of the 
courts to support changes which are as profound as she proposes. I, 
therefore, recommend ways to secure clearer comprehension. 
I. DESCRIPTION OF ONCE A CENTURY 
Professor Dragich initially examines the structural evolution of the 
federal courts2 and then analyzes the appellate courts' present circum-
stances.3 She concludes that expanding appeals and strictures, such as 
limitations on oral argument, which address them have compromised 
justice in individual cases and that multiplying dockets have made fed-
eral law increasingly incoherent.4 Professor Dragich then posits require-
ments for the circuits' third century to enhance justice and coherence.5 
She reviews various reforms-authorization of additional judgeships, 
institution of a fourth tier of courts, implementation of discretionary 
appeals and adjustment of circuit structure-which many people and 
2. See id. at 18-24. 
3. See id. at 25-28. 
4. See id. at 28-39. 
5. See id. at 39-45. 
1997] STRUCTURAL OVERHAUL OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 391 
organizations have proposed.6 Professor Dragich suggests that a com-
plex structure, incorporating certain aspects of these four possibilities, 
would be best; details its chief constituents, District Court Appellate 
Panels and a Unitary Court of Appeals; and surveys this approach's 
anticipated benefits.7 
II. ANALYSIS OF DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT 
A. Introduction 
Professor Dragich's description includes considerable informative 
material with which a number of knowledgeable individuals and institu-
tions concur. For example, there is widespread agreement about much 
in her discussion of the courts' structural evolution and their current 
condition.8 Perhaps most significant, a broad range of people and enti-
ties find that the appeals courts have experienced a crisis in volume over 
the last three decades which has modified the courts and that they have 
applied numerous techniques to treat the rising dockets. 9 
There is less consensus about these caseloads' impacts and efforts 
to address appeals. A few members of Congress and of the federal judi-
ciary, scholars, and organizations which have studied the courts sub-
scribe to Professor Dragich's assertions that the dockets and the circuit 
reforms have diluted justice in specific appeals and have made case law 
less coherent. For example, Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt and 
Professors William Reynolds and William Richman have contended that 
docket growth and these measures have eroded justice.10 Senator Con-
rad Bums (R-Mont.) and Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), the leading 
proponents of a recent legislative proposal to split.the Ninth Circuit have 
concomitantly treated incoherence and inconsistency as a major argu-
ment for dividing the court.11 
6. See id. at 45-57. 
7. See id. at 57-73. 
8. See id. at 18-28. 
9. See, e.g., CoMMTITEE ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JuDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTS 11, 41-42 (1995) [hereinafter 
LoNG RANGE PLAN]; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, at 109 (1990). Even 
the "crisis of volume" is disputed. For example, the fact that courts confront more appeals does 
not necessarily mean that there is a crisis. See Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the 
Federal Couns, 7 Omo ST. J. ON D1sP. REsoL. 115 (1991); Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a 
National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1264 (1996). 
10. See Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal 
Courts, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1993, at 52; William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, 
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. 
REv. 273, 278-97 (1996). 
11. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) 
[hereinafter Gorton statement]; id. at S7505-06 (statement of Sen. Burns) [hereinafter Bums 
statement]; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S.956, 104th 
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However, additional public officials, judges, scholars, and institu-
tions which have evaluated the courts claim that the expanding caseloads 
and reforms have not compromised justice or increased incoherence. 
For instance, former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace and 
Governor Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) believe that procedures which appeals 
courts employ have not diluted the delivery of justice.12 Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Professor Arthur Hellman have correspondingly 
found that case law remains coherent and that certain measures have 
maintained coherence, while no empirical data indicate that case law is 
incoherent.13 
It is important to examine at the outset several ideas that should 
help to explain these different perspectives on the effects of enlarged 
dockets and responses to them. One significant concept involves the 
meaning of appellate justice, a phrase which has been variously defined. 
Some appeals court judges and writers essentially concur with Professor 
Dragich's observation that "caseload pressures make it impossible for 
[appellate judges] to devote sufficient time and attention to ensure a 
thoughtful and principled decision in each case."14 There is also sub-
stantial agreement, and considerable information which indicates, that 
circuits now afford fewer procedures to increasing numbers of appeals 
particularly cases which might be characterized as "routine" or "ordi-
nary," even as relatively complex cases, such as complicated securities 
litigation, continue receiving comparatively thorough appellate 
treatment. 15 
Cong., lst Sess. (1995). Professor Dragich and other observers use coherence and consistency 
similarly. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. However, l treat consistency as narrower. 
12. See The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S.956 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, l04th Cong. (1995) (statement of Judge Wallace) [hereinafter Wallace statement]; 
Hearing on S.948 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. On 
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 284 (1990) (statement of Sen. Wilson); see also infra notes 40-46 and 
accompanying text. 
13. See Senate Judiciary Committee Markup of S.956 (Dec. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein); S.956 Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Professor Arthur Hellman) [hereinafter 
Hellman statement]; see also infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. See generally Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. l 04-197, at 10, 28-29 (l 995). 
14. Dragich, supra note l, at 32; see also Jon 0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit For An 
Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 ( 1993) (concurring judge); Reinhardt, supra 
note 10 (same); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 278, 293-97 (concurring writers); Lauren 
K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 3-4, 
38-40 (quoting judges' similar responses to survey). 
15. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 10, at 52; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 275, 
296; Robel, supra note 14, at 3-4; see also Dragich supra note l, at 29 (circuit screening of 
"routine" cases for summary treatment is admission that error correction merits less attention than 
lawmaking). I am not saying that routine cases are less worthy. See Robel, supra note 14; David 
M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (l 983); see also infra 
note 42. Reduced procedures and judicial attention are closely related. 
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However, there is a lack of consensus, and little empirical data 
which show, that appellate courts deliver less justice in the sense of 
unfairly treating, or wrongly deciding, those appeals which judges 
accord less time or limited procedural opportunities. 16 Indeed, courts 
have applied techniques, such as prebriefing conferences, partly to 
address the possibility that decreased time or procedures might reduce 
justice. 17 The claim that complex cases still enjoy comprehensive treat-
ment18 may reflect appellate courts good faith efforts to tailor temporal 
and procedural commitments to various appeals' perceived needs in 
attempting to resolve all cases on large dockets promptly, inexpensively 
and fairly by, for example, affording more judicial time and procedures 
to appeals which apparently require greater attention. 19 
Similar ideas apply to the notion of coherence in federal case law 
and help to illuminate diverse perspectives on docket growth's effects 
and measures that address it. Coherence has been susceptible to multi-
ple definitions. Professor Dragich apparently equates coherence with 
intracircuit and intercircuit consistency, while she seems to assume that 
mounting appeals have enlarged the amount of relevant case law and 
concomitantly increased incoherence.20 
Professor Dragich ascribes intracircuit inconsistency to reforms that 
restrict the publication of opinions and the citation of unpublished deci-
sions, thus obscuring the concept of "law" in a system premised on pre-
cedent, 21 even as the vast quantity of determinations issued jeopardizes 
"coherence by creating innumerable rulings which are impossible to 
assimilate."22 Professor Dragich finds that "fragmentation," which she 
attributes to the existing appellate structure, further undermines coher-
ence. For instance, Professor Dragich claims that modem circuit size 
masks the reality that a "court" is only a series of three-judge panels 
16. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. Professor Dragich claims that the ''fact that 
judges spend less time studying cases must affect their decisions" and seems to equate fewer 
procedures with less justice. Dragich, supra note 1, at 30. She does offer much support for her 
ideas, deducing, for example, that a "rushed affirmance dilutes justice" from the fact the 
"affirmance rate has risen in the years since internal reforms were implemented." Id. 
17. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
18. See supra note 15. Professor Dragich apparently agrees. See Dragich, supra note l, at 
31. 
19. Prompt, inexpensive and fair resolution is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l's touchstone, 
and it may fairly be imported to appellate procedure. See Tobias, supra note 9, at n.90. See 
generally Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1325 (1995). 
20. I rely substantially in this sentence and the next two paragraphs on Professor Dragich's 
discussion of coherence. See Dragich, supra note l, at 32-39. 
21. See id. at 33 (citations omitted). 
22. Id. (citations omitted). The two major ideas in this sentence seem to conflict. She also 
attributes inconsistency to caseload pressures which she says can lead judges to miss significant 
issues or gloss over their nuances. See id. at 32. 
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operating in a completely ad hoc manner and that measures, namely en 
bane review, for facilitating full circuit supervision of the court's own 
law are ineffective.23 She also asserts that the appointment of more 
judges additionally threatens coherence by exacerbating fragmentation. 24 
Professor Dragich considers intercircuit inconsistency equally problem-
atic. She ascribes these conflicts to the courts' autonomous nature; the 
application of doctrines, namely law of the circuit, which emphasize the 
courts' regional character; structural disincentives for the appellate 
courts to interpret the Constitution and congressional legislation simi-
larly; and reductions in the Supreme Court's monitoring and shaping of 
federal law's development from a national perspective.25 
A few observers effectively concur with Professor Dragich's sug-
gestions that multiplying appeals have limited the appellate courts' abil-
ity to maintain coherence and consistency and that case law is 
increasingly incoherent and inconsistent.26 There is also some agree-
ment, and considerable data which indicate, that circuits have confronted 
and resolved growing numbers of appeals since the 1960s, while the 
courts may have issued decisions which expanded the quantity of appli-
cable case law and correspondingly decreased coherence.27 
However, there is little consensus, and no empirical evidence which 
shows, that case law is currently incoherent or inconsistent in the sense 
that appellate constitutional and statutory interpretations are insuffi-
ciently uniform.28 Several reasons apparently explain this situation. 
First, it remains unclear that additional, relevant case law actually exists 
now and, if so, how substantial it is. For example, today a much larger 
percentage of appeals receive no written opinions or decisions which 
lack any, or have minimal or uncertain, effect as "law."29 Many cases 
that have most enlarged dockets are also the very type of appeals which 
expand case law incrementally, if at all, because they rarely become new 
legal precedent. 30 
Even were there clearly more applicable case law, this finding 
23. See id. at 33-34. But see infra notes 31, 55-56 and accompanying text. 
24. See Dragich, supra note l, at 34-35. For example, she explains that each additional 
appeals court member brings new perspectives to the law being interpreted. See id. 
25. See id. at 35-39. See generally SAMUEL EsTREICHER & JoHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE 
SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986). 
26. See Dragich, supra note 1, at 32-39; Gerald Bard Tjoftat, More Judges, Less Justice, 
A.B.A.J., July 1993, at 70; supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
27. See, e.g., LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 9, at 11; JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND 0rHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS 17-18, 21-23 (1993). 
28. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. 
29. Professor Dragich apparently agrees and reproduces relevant data. See Dragich, supra 
note 1, at 33; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
30. Many social security appeals involve review of application of well-settled law to similar 
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would not necessarily mean that it is less coherent or consistent. For 
instance, the circuit procedures which address mounting dockets as well 
as potential incoherence and inconsistency may have increased, or at 
least maintained, coherence and consistency, although it is difficult to 
ascertain the measures' precise impacts.31 Indeed, Professors Reynolds 
and Richman recently contended that growth in the amount of case law 
would enhance coherence: "more judges, writing reasoned opinions in 
all of the cases brought before them, will create a vast new body of 
precedent. . . . [T]hose precedents will make the law more certain [and] 
. . . [b ]ecause this body of precedent will be the work of judges rather 
than staff, by definition, it will be better law."32 However, Professor 
Dragich and other observers seem to assume that expanded case law 
would reduce coherence. 33 
In addition to justice and coherence, circuit variation warrants men-
tion. For example, all of the courts face larger dockets, but their size, 
complexity, and growth rate differ.34 Appellate courts also have dispa-
rate resources, namely judges, for resolving appeals and apply diverse 
measures, which may have a wide range of impacts, to treat cases and 
potential reductions in justice and coherence.35 The above concepts sug-
gest that justice and coherence can vary. 
Despite these apparent discrepancies, instructive insights on justice 
and coherence can be gleaned by emphasizing the Ninth Circuit and 
augmenting its evaluation with relevant information pertaining to other 
courts. Several factors accentuate this circuit's value for illustrative pur-
poses. The court is the largest in terms of geography, appeals, and 
judges, and the circuit has experienced rapidly expanding caseloads and 
has implemented the greatest number of, and the most innovative, mech-
anisms to address them and the possible decreases in justice and coher-
ence. Critics claim that the court's gigantic docket and reforms have 
facts. See Tobias, supra note 9, at nn.55-57. Some pro se and prisoner appeals may even be 
frivolous. See supra notes 15-19; infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 45-46 and 
accompanying text (suggesting measures meant to foster justice may promote coherence). 
32. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 339. They propose a doubling of the bench. 
33. See supra notes 11, 21-27 and accompanying text. I emphasize justice and coherence in 
this essay principally because they are central to her article. Other phenomena, such as growing 
bureaucratization, which can be ascribed to increasing dockets and other values, such as prompt 
and fair resolution, are also important to the circuits. The difficulties which the courts confront 
now and in the future thus comprise a polycentric problem. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978); Stephen C. Yeazell, The 
Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 676-78. 
34. See LoNo RANGE PLAN, supra note 9, at 45-46; MCKENNA, supra note 27, at 31. 
35. See, e.g., lsT C1R. R. 36.1; 4TH C1R. R. 34(a); 7TH C1R. R. 53. See generally Gregory C. 
Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal 
Circuits, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. No. 1 (1996); Tobias, supra note 9, at nn.18-19. 
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compromised justice and that its case law is increasingly incoherent and 
inconsistent.36 Because justice and coherence have figured prominently 
in the current and ongoing debate over the circuit's division, this contro-
versy informs understanding. 37 Certain ideas above mean that there are 
considerable empirical data and much recent information relating to the 
court.38 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis indicates, however, that justice is less 
diluted, and that federal law is more coherent, than Professor Dragich 
and other observers assert. If the court, which many critics consider the 
worst case scenario, apparently delivers higher quality justice and enun-
ciates clearer case law than they contend, appeals courts that encounter 
less docket pressure probably dispense greater justice and articulate 
more coherent case law. 
B. Appellate Justice 
It is unclear that the Ninth Circuit's increasing appeals and 
responses to them have eroded justice. One reason for this uncertainty is 
the use of different criteria to measure justice.39 An informative indi-
cium that observers employ is the time which courts need to decide 
cases. Reliance on several parameters shows that the Ninth Circuit 
resolves appeals faster than numerous courts, even as additional parame-
ters indicate that it requires greater time than some courts. For example, 
in the Ninth Circuit, the "median time from oral argument submission to 
disposition is 1.8 months, or .4 months less than the national average," 
but the average time from filing of the notice of appeal to final decision 
is 14.3 months.40 The use of other criteria in fact suggests that the 
court's cases receive much justice. For instance, observers view the 
36. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9 
(1995); supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Dragich, supra note 1, at 28-39 
(suggesting criticisms may apply to other circuits). 
37. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S.956, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1995); see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganizaiton Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 
104-197, at 10, 28-29 (1995); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY 
L.J. 1357 (1995); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to 
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 917 (1990). 
38. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 37; infra notes 40, 51; see also infra note 58. 
39. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (discussing variability). 
40. Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 MONT. L. REv. 291, 297 
(1996); see also id.(affording other parameters showing prompt resolution); Hellman Statement, 
supra note 13 ("recent data indicate [court's record] is poor by some measures, good by others"). 
But see Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9 
(1995). My use of time here differs from, but implicates, the time that judges devote to the 
resolution of appeals. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. For instance, insofar as 
Ninth Circuit judges require considerable time to decide appeals, they may deliver much justice. 
See Hellman Statement, supra. 
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number of appeals which secure written dispositions as a telling indica-
tor of justice, and the Ninth Circuit writes decisions in a higher percent-
age of cases than most courts.41 
Even when the time or the procedural opportunities afforded are 
consulted, the court may actually dispense considerable justice. For 
example, it is unclear that two severely-criticized strictures, namely lim-
itations on oral argument and on published opinions, have diluted justice 
in many appeals. My recent survey of Ninth Circuit pro se cases, which 
comprise forty percent of the national docket,42 indicated that the 
reduced attention or procedures had apparently not diminished the jus-
tice accorded in terms of fair treatment and correct results. I found 
numerous unpublished decisions in which Ninth Circuit panels, without 
oral argument, reversed district courts that too summarily dismissed 
complaints filed by unrepresented parties43 or closely analyzed, but ulti-
mately affirmed, trial judges' dismissals of clearly frivolous claims.44 
Certain measures which the Ninth Circuit and the remaining courts 
apply to treat growing dockets have enhanced, or at least maintained, 
justice. A few mechanisms that generally expedite disposition have 
improved justice. Illustrative are Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, which 
Professor Dragich apparently found so effective that she modeled her 
District Court Appellate Panels on them.45 Other techniques, such as 
prebriefing conferences which "help to narrow issues for appeal, limit 
the size of briefs, and explore the possibilities for settlement," have sim-
ilarly increased justice for some cases.46 
41. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-97, at 22 
(1995); see also Dragich, supra note 1, at 29-32 (finding written dispositions important and 
affording additional relevant information). 
42. Caseload Increases Throughout Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 1996, at I, 2. 
Incarcerated individuals pursue a significant percentage of these appeals. See id. 
43. See, e.g., Allen v. Figueroa, 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision); Deas 
v. Deas, 51 F.3d 279 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision); see also Hug, supra note 40, at 
304-05; Tobias, supra note 9, at n.45. 
44. See, e.g., Menefield v. Helsel, 78 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); 
Jenks v. Hull, 67 F.3d 307 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Tobias, supra note 9, at n.46; supra notes 15, 
19, 41 and accompanying text. This is not the type of empirical data collection that I suggest 
below. 
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1994); 9th Cir. R. 8001; see also Dragich, supra note I, at 58-62. 
See generally Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 BYU L. REv. 
545; Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's 
Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989). 
46. Tobias, supra note 37, at 1364; see also JAMES B. EAGLIN, FEDERAL Jumc1AL CENTER, 
THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS (1990). 
For analyses of more measures, see JOSEPH CECIL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); 
MCKENNA, supra note 27, at 40-42. 
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C. Coherent Federal Case Law 
The Ninth Circuit's experience indicates that case law is more 
coherent and consistent than Professor Dragich and additional observers 
of this court and others assert.47 The Ninth Circuit is significant 
because its expanding docket and apparent plethora of precedents, which 
written decisions' issuance in many appeals may accentuate,48 have 
prompted critics to assume that circuit case law is incoherent and incon-
sistent.49 Considerable research shows that this is incorrect. Illustrative 
and most relevant is Professor Hellman's work, which the Federal Judi-
cial Center (FJC) described as the "only systematic study of the opera-
tion of precedent in a large circuit."50 The scholar's several empirical 
analyses did "not support the argument that the Ninth Circuit has been 
unable to maintain consistency in its decisions," hundreds of cases' eval-
uation led him to conclude that it has "generally succeeded in avoiding 
intracircuit conflict," and he found insufficient inconsistency to require 
treatment, especially with solutions as radical as circuit-splitting.51 
Some recent research also suggests that case law across the appeals 
courts is more coherent, and intercircuit inconsistency less problematic, 
than numerous observers contend. Most applicable is additional, related 
work of Professor Hellman. He has discovered no evidence which indi-
cates that the appellate system needs more authoritative precedents.52 
Indeed, no empirical data show that case law in the Ninth Circuit or 
in the remaining courts is incoherent or inconsistent. For instance, the 
FJC stated that the "only substantial empirical work on the issue found 
little evidence for intracircuit conflicts in the largest circuit."53 The 
47. See Dragich, supra note l, at 32-39; supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying 
text (suggesting that court's gigantic docket and large number of written decisions do not mean 
that circuit case law is incoherent). 
49. Critics who find the circuit the worst case scenario may assume that other courts' 
situations wiJJ only worsen as growing dockets make them increasingly resemble it. See supra 
notes 11, 36-37 and accompanying text (suggesting that the court is also significant because the 
consistency of its case law is a major issue in the debate over the court's division). 
50. McKENNA, supra note 27, at 94. The FJC is an important research arm of the courts. See 
28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994). See generally William W Schwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center and 
the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. Rsv. 1129 (1995). 
51. Hellman Statement, supra note 13. His research is Maintaining Consistency in the Large 
Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed. 1990); Arthur D. Hellman, 
Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
915 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of 
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 541 (1989); see also Hug, supra note 
40, at 298-99; infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
52. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
lntercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. Rsv. 693 (1995); see also infra note 55 and accompanying 
text (affording additional relevant findings). 
53. McKENNA, supra note 27, at 15. It was alluding to Professor Hellman's work. 
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authors of the 1995 Senate Committee Report, written in support of a 
circuit-dividing bill, were compelled to concede that "one empirical 
study suggested that the Ninth Circuit may not suffer from significant 
intracircuit conflicts" and were reduced to making the tepid statement: 
"[a]necdotal evidence indicates that the ninth circuit is marked by an 
increased incidence of intracircuit confl.icts."54 Respected studies by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States in 1995 and the FJC during 
1993 found empirical material which shows that case law is coherent 
and consistent beyond the confines of this circuit. For example, the 
Conference declared that "current empirical data on the number, fre-
quency, tolerability, and persistence of unresolved intercircuit conflicts 
. . . indicate that intercircuit inconsistency is not a problem that now 
calls for change," thereby confirming the FJC's conclusions.55 
The Ninth Circuit and other courts employ measures which seem to 
foster coherence and consistency. For instance, the Ninth Circuit staff 
attorney office reviews every case and codes into a computer the issues 
to be resolved.56 The court then assigns to the same three-judge panel 
those appeals that raise similar issues and are ready for disposition at the 
same time. The circuit also uses a limited en bane mechanism to main-
tain coherent and consistent case law, although observers dispute how 
much coherence and consistency the court has realized. 57 
In sum, this assessment suggests that the decreasing justice and 
coherence which Professor Dragich attributes to multiplying appeals are 
imperfectly understood. Indeed, justice and coherence may well have 
increased. Even if both have clearly declined, those reductions' extent 
and whether they are troubling enough to warrant treatment would resist 
very precise delineation. In the final analysis, there is inadequate infor-
mation respecting justice and coherence to permit definitive conclusions. 
54. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-97, at 10 
(1995) (emphasis added). The authors did assert that the study, which was apparently Professor 
Hellman's, had received criticism. Id. at 10 n.19. 
55. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 9, at 46 (citing Professor Hellman's FJC study). The FJC 
relied upon his work and its own study. See McKENNA, supra note 27, at 57-65; see also id. at 15 
(finding "inconsistent interpretation and application of federal law by different courts of appeals is 
not ... a significant problem"); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, at 125 
( 1990) (finding little empirical data on, and calling for study of, intercircuit conflicts). 
56. I rely in this sentence and the next on McKENNA, supra note 27, at 50-51; Arthur D. 
Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Couns: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REv. 
937, 945 (1980); see also Hug, supra note 40, at 30 l. 
57. Compare Gorton Statement, supra note 11, and Bums Statement, supra note 11, with 
Wallace Statement, supra note 12, and Hellman Statement, supra note 13. Most circuits require 
judges to circulate drafts to their colleagues who may respond if the "opinion conflicts with the 
law of the circuit or if they have a case pending on a similar issue and a consistent approach is 
needed." McKENNA, supra note 27, at 97. For analyses of more measures, see CECIL, supra note 
46; Hug, supra note 40, at 300-01. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF PRESCRIPTIONS 
A. An Introductory Word About Descriptions and Prescriptions 
I emphasize justice and coherence throughout this essay because 
they are essential to Professor Dragich's descriptions and prescriptions. 
It is important to recognize that additional phenomena, such as increas-
ing bureaucratization, can be ascribed to docket growth and that other 
values, namely prompt, inexpensive and fair appellate resolution, are 
significant to the federal courts. These concepts mean that the complica-
tions which the appeals courts presently address, and will meet in the 
twenty-first century, constitute a polycentric problem, the efficacious 
resolution of which will require application of a complex mix of possi-
ble solutions. 
Numerous ideas above and much expert research show that there is 
now insufficient comprehension of justice, coherence, and many addi-
tional attributes of the courts to support dispositive determinations, 
much less fundamental circuit restructuring. For instance, the Federal 
Courts Study Committee apparently found so little consensus about jus-
tice, coherence, and other phenomena affecting the courts that it primar-
ily described potential remedies for difficulties which purportedly 
implicate the appellate system and called for further study. 58 When the 
Judicial Conference and the FJC recently assessed the appeals courts, 
they evinced similar skepticism regarding those attributes and analogous 
reluctance to prescribe solutions. 
Insofar as the Conference and the FJC mentioned incoherence, 
neither believed it problematic enough to deserve remediation, espe-
cially with structural reforms, ostensibly because no empirical data so 
indicated. For example, one Conference recommendation stated: "Cir-
cuit restructuring should occur only if compelling empirical evidence 
demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a court so 
that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent 
circuit law in the face of increasing workload."59 The FJC proclaimed 
that "structural change to resolve intercircuit conflicts . . . is likely to 
provide relatively little benefit at a relatively high cost [and that] ... 
[m]aking structural changes solely to reduce current levels of intracircuit 
inconsistency ... is likely to do more harm than good."60 
58. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, at 109-25 (1990). 
59. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 9, at 44; see also id. at 46 (finding no such evidence and 
"current empirical data ... [indicating] intercircuit inconsistency is not a problem that now calls 
for change"); supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
60. McKENNA, supra note 27. at 15; see also id. (finding little data showing either form of 
inconsistency is problematic). The studies found reduced justice insufficiently problematic to 
need treatment but evinced concern about it. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
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Finally, Professor Dragich correctly observes that Congress has not 
responded in a decisive manner to the decreased justice on appeal and 
case law coherence which she detects. Indeed, the recent machinations 
involving the proposal to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit show that legisla-
tive inaction relating to this court and the appellate system may well 
have been advisable and that inadequate understanding of the appeals 
courts exists.61 
In short, because justice and coherence, the two phenomena which 
are critical to Professor Dragich's suggestions and additional significant 
attributes are not clearly comprehended, it is exceedingly difficult to 
analyze her proposals. There is also insufficient information on which 
to premise confidently changes as profound as those that she recom-
mends, while the material which is available warrants caution before 
adopting major modifications. Despite the above caveats, mainly per-
taining to Professor Dragich's descriptions, I assume for the purpose of 
evaluating her prescriptions that growing dockets have reduced justice 
and coherence enough to be characterized as serious complications 
which need remediation. 
B. Assessment of Prescriptions 
1. ADVANTAGES 
Professor Dragich has crafted valuable, elegant suggestions for 
revamping the federal courts to address the decreased justice and coher-
ence that she perceives. Her proposed structural overhaul, which would 
substitute District Court Appellate Panels and a Unitary Court of 
Appeals for the twelve regional circuits, could afford certain benefits. 
Professor Dragich's recommendations might increase justice and coher-
ence, even if the phenomena are less problematic than she claims. The 
Appellate Panels may improve the quality of justice that individual cases 
receive by emphasizing error correction. The Court of Appeals could 
enhance coherence by focusing on lawmaking and attempting to clarify 
constitutional and statutory interpretation. Professor Dragich's reforms 
might also promote other values which are important to the federal 
courts. For instance, if the two tribunals function as she intends, they 
CoMMITI'EE, at 109-10 (1990); LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 9, at 43-46; McKENNA, supra, at 
13-14; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-97, 
at 23 (1995) (stating that no thorough appeals courts study has occurred since the 1973 Hruska 
Commission study). 
61. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a circuit-splitting bill only after 
adding Arizona and Nevada to the Pacific Northwest states to create a proposed Twelfth Circuit. 
The Senate then passed a study commission measure that the House did not pass. See supra note 
37 and accompanying text; see also Dragich, supra note l, at 18. 
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may facilitate more expeditious and economical resolution of some 
cases. 
One reason why her prescriptions could offer these advantages is 
that Professor Dragich carefully draws upon several ideas-authorizing 
more judges, making all appeals discretionary, creating a fourth tier and 
adjusting circuit structure-which Congress, the judiciary and experts 
have considered for decades but which remain controversial. Moreover, 
she astutely manages to exploit the suggestions' best features and to 
minimize their less desirable aspects.62 A helpful illustration is her call 
for Appellate Panels which may improve justice in many cases that raise 
the possibility of error by essentially adding new judges whose core 
responsibility would be error correction.63 She concomitantly eschews 
Congress' century-long approach of only approving more judges for the 
existing system as a palliative which would not enhance justice or coher-
ence partly because it will exacerbate intracircuit inconsistency.64 Pro-
fessor Dragich also proposes that some appellate jurisdiction be 
discretionary, that another tier be effectively invoked, and that the cur-
rent circuits be dramatically restructured while rejecting recommenda-
tions for every appeal to be discretionary, for the formal establishment 
of a fourth tier, and for the mere reconfiguration of the present appellate 
system.65 She does so principally because the latter reforms could fail to 
promote justice or coherence. For example, completely discretionary 
jurisdiction might jeopardize justice by permitting the denial of appeals 
in worthy cases, while another tier may threaten justice by unduly 
extending the appellate process. 66 
Finally, Professor Dragich's cogent prescriptions should provoke 
critical thinking about numerous issues that are significant to the federal 
courts' future. Her proposals specifically illuminate the need to assem-
ble, assess and synthesize the maximum relevant information on the 
62. She candidly states that this was her intent, a result which she has substantially achieved. 
See id. at 66; see also id. at 45-57 (analyzing four major proposals). 
63. This proposal would capitalize on existing judicial capacity in the district courts and limit 
the need to appoint promptly many new judges which would complicate the Panels' 
implementation, although the Panels' duties would require numerous new judges. See id. at 59 
n.274. See generally Baker, supra note 37, at 952; Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an 
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 309 (1996). 
64. See Dragich, supra note I, at 45-49. Some find this approach outmoded and inadequate 
for the circuits' third century. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JusT1CE ON APPEAL: THE 
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 101-05, 147-50, 181-85 (1994); Tjoflat, supra note 
26. But see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 297. 
65. Her partial use of the reforms also makes her proposals appear more evolutionary. See 
Dragich, supra note l, at 66. I am not criticizing this use. Indeed, she significantly advances the 
inquiry by creatively assembling a more workable package. 
66. See id. at 41, 49-57. 
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complications which the circuits now face and will confront in the next 
half-century, thus facilitating the problems' efficacious resolution. 
2. DISADVANTAGES 
Despite the benefits which implementation of Professor Dragich's 
suggestions might afford, they may impose disadvantages. These 
adverse impacts are difficult to identify primarily because justice, coher-
ence and many other attributes of the judicial system are imperfectly 
understood. Moreover, the structure that she advocates has never actu-
ally existed. However, the earlier federal courts and a few state judiciar-
ies resemble the tribunals which Professor Dragich recommends67 and 
experts have posited and analyzed similar concepts.68 Thus it is possible 
to extract relevant information, or extrapolate, from those experiences. 
A commonplace saying is that the "devil is in the details," but this 
idea seems peculiarly applicable to Professor Dragich's prescriptions 
because many theoretical and practical complications would apparently 
accompany their effectuation and could detrimentally affect justice, 
coherence and additional important values. Some problems would prob-
ably attend Appellate Panels' institution and functioning. Several issues 
implicate the tribunals' personnel and their responsibilities. The process 
of selecting most current federal judges has emphasized different qualifi-
cations for appointment to the appellate and trial tiers.69 For instance, 
few district judges have been members of appeals courts or have 
actively participated in appellate practice. Moreover, federal trial court 
experience may only minimally improve their service on Appellate 
Panels, although numerous district judges secure appeals court expertise 
when sitting by designation on appellate courts 70 and this experience 
would resemble less closely the judges' existing trial court duties than 
their responsibilities as Panel members.71 
Present district judges might perform certain duties of the Appellate 
Panels rather ineffectively principally because they could consider them 
distasteful, unrewarding or tedious. For example, the judges may be 
reluctant to review rigorously, and find erroneous, rulings of colleagues 
67. See id. at 58-62. 
68. See, e.g .. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, at 116-17; BAKER, supra 
note 64, at 198-215, 234-79; McKENNA, supra note 27, at 105-21. 
69. See Tobias, supra note 37, at 1402; see also Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial 
Selection, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1257, 1266, 1272 (stating that numerous circuit judges initially 
serve as district judges). 
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1994). See generally Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, 
Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by 
Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351 (1995). 
71. See Dragich, supra note 1, at 58-62. I am only saying that district judges might be better 
qualified to assume these duties, not that they are unsuited. 
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who occupy identical positions in the judicial hierarchy and with whom 
they enjoy continuing, valuable professional and personal relation-
ships.72 Judges, when discharging somewhat similar obligations in the 
1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts (JIA), evinced considerable 
unwillingness to evaluate, much less suggest modifications in, proce-
dures which district judges had adopted.73 Many district judges might 
also find unfulfilling the duties to scrutinize lengthy, boring trial tran-
scripts and to assess claims of mistakes that could lead to reversal or to 
additional proceedings in appeals, most of which will by definition be 
routine. These activities sharply contrast with the satisfying challenges 
that numerous district judges apparently experience in resolving com-
plex, intellectually stimulating litigation.74 
Another potential difficulty with Appellate Panels' operation 
involves the responsibility to decide whether Panels or the Unitary Court 
of Appeals must initially hear cases. Judges may encounter problems 
differentiating between appeals that require error correction and law-
making, particularly in those cases which seem to implicate both func-
tions. Professor Dragich's proposal that Panels apply existing standards 
of appellate review affords insufficient specificity to treat felicitously 
numerous appeals.75 Her concomitant reliance on a trichotomy of easy, 
hard, and very hard cases appears no more helpful.76 Exercises which 
require line drawing can also consume scarce resources of judges, law-
yers, and parties. Recent experience, primarily in the district courts with 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing sanctions and discovery and 
with related provisions adopted under the 1990 JIA, suggests the diffi-
culties of making distinctions as refined as those that Professor 
Dragich's recommendations would necessitate.77 For instance, to ascer-
tain whether prefiling inquiries or discovery requests were reasonable, 
litigants and counsel prepared and filed papers and presented evidence in 
72. This may be especially true if the panels are drawn from the "same or nearby districts." 
Id. at 58-59; see also IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEw Soc1AL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) (discussing continuing relationships); Marc Galanter, Why the 
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'v REv. 95 
(1974) (same). 
73. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization]; Carl Tobias, Improving the 
1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589 (1994). Most judges are very 
protective of their prerogatives to adopt local procedures. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for 
Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1995). 
74. See Robel, supra note 14, at 3-11. I recognize that circuit judges often, and district judges 
occasionally, discharge duties similar to those prescribed for Panels and that federal judges will 
fulfill the oath of office that they have sworn to uphold. 
75. See Dragich, supra note l, at 59-60. 
76. See id. at 60; see also McKENNA, supra note 27, at 51. 
77. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll, 26, 37; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)-(b) (1994). 
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hearings and conferences, while judges read the documents, presided at 
the proceedings and issued decisions.78 
Some problems could accompany the effectuation and operation of 
the Unitary Court of Appeals. These difficulties should be fewer, and 
less troubling, than the ones that would attend Appellate Panels' imple-
mentation primarily because the duties of Court of Appeals judges 
would rather closely resemble their current responsibilities. The Court 
of Appeals, nonetheless, might experience several complications, espe-
cially involving case selection, which are analogous to the problems that 
the Appellate Panels would confront.79 
An additional possible difficulty with Professor Dragich's prescrip-
tions is that the members of Congress who must adopt, and the federal 
judges who must implement, the reforms may oppose them. First, those 
officials might find that the proposals depart too substantially from the 
status quo while trenching too much on certain established interests. 
These ideas are manifested in the "strong or moderate opposition" which 
a large majority of appellate and district judges recently registered to 
hypothetical suggestions that resembled those of Professor Dragich. so 
Many federal judges have also strenuously resisted recommendations for 
expanding the bench.81 Numerous senators would probably oppose Pro-
fessor Dragich's prescriptions, if the lawmakers believed that her 
reforms might somehow dilute their judicial selection prerogatives, 
which seem to be one of the last vestiges of unalloyed political 
patronage. 82 
I am not saying that the preferences of members of Congress or of 
the judiciary should control potential federal court improvements, partic-
ularly ones which purport to deliver more justice. 83 Instead, the views 
of senators and representatives to whom the Constitution assigns respon-
sibility for federal court policymaking and the perspectives of judges 
who must effectuate any changes that Congress prescribes deserve seri-
ous consideration. No proposals for modifying the courts, especially 
78. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 1013 (1988); 
Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 73, at 1422-23; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 
Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. Rav. 933 (1991). 
79. Perhaps most significant, when the Court of Appeals exercises discretionary review, it 
will probably face difficulties that are similar to the ones which the Appellate Panels must address 
when drawing lines. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
80. See MCKENNA, supra note 27, at 139; see also Dragich, supra note 1, at 63 n.291. 
81. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 14; Tjoftat, supra note 26; see also supra note 63 
(suggesting Panels' creation would require numerous new judges). 
82. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE (1988); Laura E. Little, Loyalty, 
Gratitude and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. Rav. 699 (1995); Tobias, supra note 69. 
83. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for l.Arge Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 JuD1CATURE 
288 (1994) (suggesting courts should operate in best interest of public, not judges); Richman and 
Reynolds, supra note 10, at 338 (same). 
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alterations as dramatic as Professor Dragich suggests, will succeed with-
out the support or at least the cooperation of Congress and the 
judiciary.84 
In short, the disadvantages which would apparently attend the insti-
tution of Professor Dragich's recommendations indicate that their imple-
mentation may not foster justice, coherence or other important values. 
However, uncertainty about all of her suggestions' impacts and the exact 
nature of justice, coherence and numerous additional phenomena pre-
cludes definitive conclusions. This lack of clarity also complicates 
accurate evaluation of many prescriptions' efficacy, which could mean 
that some approaches are superior to Professor Dragich's proposals, or 
at least that caution is warranted when considering changes which are as 
fundamental as she espouses. The uncertainty is not a criticism of her 
insightful contributions. Indeed, many of Professor Dragich's thought-
provoking ideas and a number of the concepts explored above show that 
there is a compelling need for much greater, and considerably more pre-
cise, information respecting the appellate courts before Congress sub-
stantially modifies them. The fourth section of my response, 
accordingly, suggests ways to improve understanding of the circuits, of 
the most pressing problems which they face, and of the finest solutions 
to these difficulties. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introduction 
Recommendations for the future require relatively limited treatment 
in this essay because quite a few people and entities, which are familiar 
with the federal judicial process, have provided numerous cogent ideas 
elsewhere. For example, Professor Thomas E. Baker, who has thor-
oughly examined the appeals courts, and the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee, have recently called for comprehensive studies of the appellate 
courts to clarify imperfect comprehension. 85 
Evaluators must rigorously collect, analyze and synthesize the max-
imum applicable empirical data, both on the appellate system and on 
individual regional circuits, remembering that they may vary signifi-
84. See Hug, supra note 40, at 306; Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 
1995, S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8 (1995); Hellman Statement, supra note 13. These factors are not 
a compelling reason to criticize her proposals, which could lead to an efficacious solution, even if 
Congress rejects them. My concerns are that proposals have a realistic prospect of being adopted 
and improve the courts. 
85. See BAKER, supra note 64, at 292-300; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, at 116-17 (1990); see also S.956 Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Heflin) 
(suggesting similar study); supra note 61 (same). I have afforded some suggestions in Tobias, 
supra note 9, and Tobias, supra note 37. 
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cantly. Assessors should compile material which identifies the most 
vexing complications that the appeals courts currently experience and 
will encounter in the next half-century as well as a broad range of possi-
ble remedies for these problems. Evaluators ought to seek the help of 
many public and private organizations, including the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees, the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, the American Bar Association, the American Judicature Society 
and the National Center for State Courts which possess considerable rel-
evant expertise and information on the federal courts. Further, assessors 
must capitalize on previous studies such as those of the FJC and the 
Federal Courts Study Committee.86 
Evaluators should initially answer some normative questions or 
attempt to enunciate expressly and fully the normative presuppositions 
which are central to their efforts. Certain of these questions resist easy 
resolution and are comparatively theoretical. For instance, the above 
discussion demonstrates that appellate justice and case law coherence 
must be defined more clearly. Other normative issues are principally 
practical. Illustrative are the resources which the United States should 
devote, and the appropriations that Congress will authorize, to deliver 
every appeal the justice it deserves; these ideas assume that greater judi-
cial attention would benefit cases which now receive less treatment and 
the appeals courts without compromising the expeditious, economical 
and fair disposition of substantial dockets.87 
B. Potential Problems 
When assessors specifically explore potential difficulties that the 
appellate courts presently confront and will face, the evaluators should 
invoke the largest amount of relevant empirical material and remember 
the normative questions considered above. Assessors must attempt to 
identify those phenomena affecting the appellate courts which warrant 
denomination as problems, the exact nature of the complications that are 
most pressing, and whether they are sufficiently troubling to deserve 
treatment. The attributes which can be ascribed to docket growth, and to 
mechanisms which address it, obviously need emphasis. Evaluators thus 
86. See McKENNA, supra note 27; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
(1990). These entities and studies are not exhaustive. For more, see BAKER, supra note 64, at 
295-96. 
87. Some issues have theoretical and pragmatic features. For example, how significant 
should litigant satisfaction be and how do oral argument and written decisions affect parties' 
experience of appellate review? See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or 
Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 66-68, 75-86 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 
YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: 
The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part I, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1172-77. 
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should stress justice and coherence, although the examination through-
out this essay illustrates the complexities entailed in defining and ana-
lyzing these phenomena. Assessors, therefore, ought to define these 
attributes as clearly as possible and develop the most refined methods 
for measuring them. 
The tenet of prompt, inexpensive, and equitable appellate resolu-
tion, as well as the distinctions between fairly treating or correctly decid-
ing cases and the procedures or judicial attention afforded, could serve 
as departure points for attempting to assign a meaning to justice. 88 
However, these rather rudimentary definitions require elaboration, so 
that the idea of justice will have the clearest meaning. The earlier dis-
cussion of coherence indicates that the phenomenon is more difficult to 
define than justice, that consistency may not fully capture coherence and 
that the notion of clarity in constitutional and statutory interpretation 
might offer some guidance.89 The meaning of coherence, therefore, 
deserves expansion and elucidation. 
Evaluators should also gather, scrutinize and synthesize the greatest 
quantity of applicable empirical data which measure as accurately as 
possible circuits' delivery of justice and enunciation of case law. Exam-
ples of the cype of endeavors that I envision are the above examination 
of Ninth Circuit pro se appeals, which is an admittedly circumscribed 
effort to analyze justice,90 and Professor Hellman's meticulous research 
that implicates coherence.91 
Assessors could specifically estimate the impacts of provisions, 
such as restrictions on written decisions, which courts employ to treat 
multiplying dockets and which some critics claim dilute the delivery of 
justice.92 Evaluators similarly might calculate the effects of mecha-
nisms, namely computerized issue coding and case assignments and lim-
ited en bane review, that respond to mounting appeals and potential 
incoherence and that purportedly do not maintain coherence.93 Asses-
sors could additionally consider justice and coherence in terms of partic-
ular parameters, such as litigant satisfaction and costs to courts, 
88. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 39-46 and 
accompanying text. Literature on the broader concept of justice is legion. See, e.g., RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
89. See supra notes 20-33, 47-57 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. Evaluators should consult, and consider 
applying, the specific methodologies that Professor Hellman has employed. 
92. See supra notes 4, 9-10, 15 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 12, 16-17, 42-46 
and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 4, 9, 11, 23 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 13, 31-32, 56-57 
and accompanying text. 
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attorneys and parties.94 
Evaluators should next attempt to identify the phenomena affecting 
the circuits which can be characterized as difficulties and which now, 
and subsequently will, pose the most pressing complications for the 
appeals courts.95 Assessors then ought to delineate as precisely as possi-
ble those attributes' nature, whether they vary across circuits and by case 
types, and whether the problems are severe enough to warrant 
remediation. 
C. Potential Solutions 
It is difficult to afford very specific guidance regarding potential 
solutions absent clearer understanding of the most vexing complications 
which courts confront today and will face in the future. However, I can 
offer general suggestions by assuming that some phenomena which 
affect the circuits are sufficiently problematic to require treatment and 
by emphasizing approaches that address growing dockets because Con-
gress will not constrict jurisdiction. 96 
Evaluators must attempt to designate the most efficacious meas-
ures. Assessors ought to rely upon the maximum amount of relevant 
empirical information, keeping in mind the applicable normative ques-
tions.97 Evaluators should rigorously analyze a broad spectrum of 
potential remedies which may be classified as structural alternatives, 
including circuit realignment, and non-structural options, such as discre-
tionary appeals. Courts have adopted quite a few mechanisms that do 
not require congressional authorization,98 while expert individuals and 
institutions have formulated, espoused or assessed numerous others.99 
Evaluators must remember that various solutions could apply to the 
94. The parameters in the text apply to both justice and coherence. Other parameters, such as 
time for appellate resolution, may pertain exclusively or principally to justice or coherence. 
Assessors should apply analyses similar to that for justice and coherence to other phenomena 
which significantly affect the circuits by defining and assessing the phenomena. 
95. I can afford only general guidance about the ideas in this paragraph until assessors 
scrutinize relevant data. Even with that information, assessors may have to make complex value-
laden judgments, comparisons and predictions. For example, identification of the most pressing 
problems in the next century will require clear understanding of today's difficulties, comparison of 
their relative severity, and projections into the future. See supra note 33. 
96. Many agree that rising appeals require treatment because Congress will not shrink 
jurisdiction. See Dragich, supra note l, at 16-17; see also Stephen G. Breyer, Administering 
Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995). 
An example is the 1994 crime legislation. The focus in the text also permits analysis of measures 
that implicate justice and coherence. I am not saying that they warrant remediation, but evaluators 
should ascertain whether either does. 
97. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra notes 45-46, 56 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 64, at 106-284; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY 
410 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI I.AW REVIEW [Vol. 51:389 
appellate system or particular courts and should determine whether sys-
temic or circuit-specific approaches would be appropriate. 
Assessors ought to examine efficacy by quantitatively and qualita-
tively estimating the advantages and disadvantages of possible remedies. 
For instance, evaluators might calculate the number and significance of 
measures' beneficial and detrimental impacts on the most severe 
problems that currently, and will later, plague the courts; on justice and 
coherence; on appeals' expeditious, economical and fair disposition; and 
on additional important values. 100 Assessors could also glean instructive 
insights on effectiveness from the endeavors mentioned in the paragraph 
immediately above, 101 similar analyses of federal and state appellate 
court application of numerous proposed solutions, 102 and many other 
studies. 103 
Evaluators should concomitantly attempt to match the mechanisms 
that they survey with the complications which assessors discover the 
circuits address and will meet. For example, if evaluators conclude that 
the provision of fewer appellate procedures constitutes a serious prob-
lem which warrants treatment, assessors might examine more wide-
spread application of approaches that have apparently improved the 
delivery of justice, the development of new techniques which may do so, 
or experimentation with both possibilities. 104 
Evaluators will probably be unable to identify a single preferable 
measure that efficaciously resolves the major difficulties which appeals 
courts presently experience and will encounter in the future. Assessors, 
therefore, ought to designate as precisely as possible that mix of reme-
dies which would be best, especially by predicting how numerous prom-
ising solutions could operate in varying combinations. For instance, if 
one mechanism might rectify a critical complication but may jeopardize 
an important value and a second technique would temper this threat and 
impose no disadvantages, the two procedures' application could be 
indicated. 
COMMITTEE, at 116-17 (1990); MCKENNA, supra note 27, at 66-92, 95-121; Dragich, supra note l, 
at 45-57. 
100. My analysis of Professor Dragich's proposals illustrates the type of analysis that I 
envision. See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text. However, evaluators should also subject 
her proposals to the more extensive examination which I suggest in this section. 
101. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
102. The National Ceriter for State Courts is a repository of valuable data on state courts. See 
generally BAKER, supra note 64, at 298; FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 43-65 (1994). 
103. Evaluators might also consider measures that other countries have applied. See Martin 
Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 629 (1980). 
104. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Evaluators may also prescribe 
experimentation with measures that have received only limited application or minimal analysis or 
the efficacy of which remains unclear. See Tobias, supra note 37, at 1405-07. 
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In the final analysis, evaluators must undertake a carefully-cali-
brated assessment that thoroughly considers the problems which appear 
to be the most substantial and the comparative efficacy of a broad spec-
trum of potential remedies for those difficulties. At that juncture, evalu-
ators should be able to identify the finest approaches for treating the 
worst complications which the appeals courts will confront during the 
twenty-first century. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Once a Century contributes significantly to an understanding of the 
federal courts. There is much agreement about many, but less consensus 
regarding a few, aspects of the article. Most important, it remains 
unclear that increasing dockets have reduced appellate justice or case 
law coherence and, if so, sufficiently to require remediation. Indeed, 
without better understanding of those and other phenomena which affect 
the appeals courts, caution is warranted in adopting reforms that are as 
far-reaching as the ones Professor Dragich proposes. My response sug-
gests ways to enhance comprehension of justice, coherence, and these 
attributes. Once there is clearer understanding, measures which will 
improve the circuits in their next century can be instituted. 
